Compare and contrast the political developments and the trajectory of democracy in <u>Pakistan-Bangladesh</u>, with a particular focus on the relationship between Islamic movements and secular/modernist groups within society.

The political landscapes of South Asian Muslim-majority countries have been profoundly influenced by complex interactions among religion, nationalism, and modernity over the years. Pakistan and Bangladesh serve as particularly notable examples of this dynamic. Both nations emerged from the upheaval of Partition: Pakistan was founded in 1947 as a homeland for Muslims in South Asia, whereas Bangladesh came into being in 1971 as a secessionist state, asserting its linguistic and cultural identity in response to the perceived homogenisation of Islam. Despite their common origins, the political paths and democratic developments of Pakistan and Bangladesh have diverged significantly. This contrast is especially evident when examining the roles of Islamic movements in relation to secular or modernist forces within their societies. Understanding the interplay of these elements in both contexts is essential for grasping the broader tensions between religion and the state in the Muslim world, particularly in postcolonial nations grappling with issues of identity formation, governance, and legitimacy.

Islamic movements encompass organized efforts by groups or individuals to integrate Islamic principles into the public sphere, enforce Sharia law, or establish an Islamic state. These movements can range from moderate political parties to militant organizations.[1] In contrast, secularism advocates for the separation of religion from government and public policy, often linked to liberal or democratic ideologies. Within these societies, modernist forces typically promote pluralism and democratic governance, while opposing both religious orthodoxy and authoritarianism that is justified by religion.[2] Nonetheless, the distinctions between these

categories can be ambiguous, as political actors frequently leverage both religious and secular narratives to enhance their legitimacy and garner support.

This essay asserts that despite Pakistan and Bangladesh sharing a common religious heritage, the trajectories of their Islamic movements and secular-modernist forces have diverged significantly due to differing political settlements, state-building processes, and elite agendas. Through a comparative analysis, this essay investigates how these forces have influenced the

---

[1] Delwar Hossain, "Secularization, De-secularization and Re-secularization in Bangladesh: Does the 'Third Image' Matter," *Studies in Indian Politics* 12, no. 1 (March 14, 2024): 78–90, https://doi.org/10.1177/23210230241235359

[2] Ibid, 78-90.

establishment of democratic pathways in each country, considering their historical origins, political institutions, civil society dynamics, and contemporary challenges.

The partition of British India in 1947 established Pakistan as a homeland for Muslims, yet the nature of the state was contested from the outset. The two-nation theory was significant in the establishment of Pakistan in 1947; however, it was inadequate in recognizing the country's multi-ethnic, multilingual, and diverse political landscape. This oversight ultimately contributed to the formation of Bangladesh in 1971. The two-nation theory centred on religion as the foundation for national unity; however, cultural and economic differences made this challenging. The Bengali identity, rooted in language and tradition, conflicted with the central government's push to promote Urdu. The Language Movement in the early 1950s initiated unrest in East Pakistan, demonstrating that religion alone could not establish a cohesive national identity. [3]

In contrast, Bangladesh emerged from its 1971 liberation war with a vision of secular nationalism rooted in its Bengali linguistic and cultural identity. While acknowledging Islam as the faith of the majority, the founding constitution of Bangladesh enshrined secularism as a fundamental principle, explicitly rejecting the communalism that had characterized Pakistan's political landscape. The early years of Bangladesh were marked by efforts to cultivate a secular civic culture through state-led cultural initiatives, reflecting a conscious departure from Pakistan's religious nationalism.[4] Nonetheless, both nations retained a shared Islamic heritage and a significant religious majority, which set the stage for ongoing tensions between secular and religious forces.

---

[3] Khizar Jawad and Ghulam Shabbir, "The Two-Nation Theory: Historical Roots, Political Implications and Contemporary relevance," *Pakistan Social Sciences Review* 9, no. I (January 2025): 65–66, https://doi.org/10.35484/pssr.2025(9-i)06

[4] Mascha Schulz, "Singing Songs for a Secular Society? The Elusive Politics of Cultural Activism in Contemporary Bangladesh," *Modern Asian Studies* 58, no. 3 (April 2024): 957–79, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x24000210

In Pakistan, the trajectory of democracy has been deeply intertwined with military rule and the instrumentalization of Islam. Since independence, Pakistan has alternated between elected governments and military regimes, with the latter often invoking Islamic legitimacy to consolidate power. Islam has played a crucial role in shaping Pakistan's history, often leading to conflicts with secularism. In 1956, Pakistan was officially designated as an Islamic Republic, and the 1973 constitution affirmed Islam as the state religion. During Ayub Khan's presidency from 1958-1969, efforts were made to reconcile Islamic principles with secular governance; however, he ultimately yielded to religious leaders by establishing the Central Institute of Islamic Research. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's administration (1971-1977) faced pressure from groups like Jamaat-e-Islami to classify the Ahmadiyya community as non-Muslims, a decision that Bhutto resisted, citing concerns about its potential economic repercussions.[5]

General Zia-ul-Haq's regime from 1977 to 1988 represented a pivotal moment in Pakistan's history, as he aimed to infuse Islamic values into the legal and educational systems to legitimize his rule. Zia's Islamization initiatives fundamentally altered the ideological underpinnings of the state, marginalizing secular viewpoints and empowering religious political parties like Jamaat-e-Islami.[6] Although these groups frequently encountered challenges in electoral competition, they significantly influenced public discourse and policymaking, which ultimately contributed to a contraction of democratic space in the country.

The post-Zia era in Pakistan marked an increasing fusion of religion and state, a trend that persisted throughout General Pervez Musharraf's tenure from 1999 to 2008. While Musharraf sought to cultivate a modern image through his advocacy for "enlightened moderation," his regime achieved little in terms of separating religion from politics. Rather, it embodied a hybrid

[5] Zahid Shahab Ahmed, "Islam and the Politics of Secularism in Pakistan," *Religions* 14, no. 3 (March 19, 2023): 416, https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14030416

[6] Zahid Shahab Ahmed, "Islam and the Politics of Secularism in Pakistan," *Religions* 14, no. 3 (March 19, 2023): 416, https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14030416

form of authoritarianism characterized by military dominance and a superficial semblance of electoral legitimacy. Civil-military relations presented significant challenges to democratic consolidation, as fragile institutions and a politicized judiciary facilitated military interference in civilian governance.[7] Musharraf's government interacted with Islamist political parties in a complicated way. Although he aimed to reduce Islamist influence, his policies inadvertently empowered certain groups, resulting in significant political and security challenges.[8] Moreover, General Pervez Musharraf adopted a nuanced approach to Islamic movements in Pakistan, shaped by both domestic and international pressures following the 9/11 attacks. In the aftermath of these events, Western media rapidly began to associate Muslims with terrorism. Faced with the challenges of Afghanistan's proximity and the critical decision of whether to align with Afghanistan or the United States, Musharraf opted to collaborate with the U.S.[9] Islamist movements and religious political parties in Pakistan opposed President Musharraf's "Enlightened Moderation" and partnership with the United States after 9/11, viewing these policies as betrayals of Islamic values and national sovereignty. This resistance led to widespread protests and significant challenges for his administration. The rise of groups like Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) highlights the struggle to align religious sentiments with state policies, placing additional pressure on both military and civilian leadership and complicating the democratic process.[10]

---

[7] HPI Nadeeshani, "A Comparative Study of the Recent Political Trends of Pakistan and Bangladesh That Fluctuate between Democracy and Autocracy," *The International Journal of Humanities and Social Studies* 7, no. 11 (November 30, 2019), https://doi.org/10.24940/theijhss/2019/v7/i11/hs1911-101

[8] John Gambrell and Munir Ahmed, "Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan Martial Ruler in 9/11 Wars, Dies," Apnews.Com, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-politics-pakistan-government-obituaries-b2fd939ae5643c60d6e702e77626a57b

[9] Vali Nasr, "Military Rule, Islamism and Democracy in Pakistan," *The Middle East Journal* 58, no. 2 (April 1, 2004): 201–202, https://doi.org/10.3751/58.2.12

[10] Fatima Binte Asif, "Religion as a Political Tool: Analysing How Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) Uses Islam as a Campaigning Tool," *SSLA Culminating Experience* (2024).

Bangladesh has gone through its own phases of military dictatorship and autocracy, especially following the 1975 coup and the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Nevertheless, since the restoration of electoral democracy in 1991, the country has made notable, though inconsistent, strides toward democratic consolidation. The political landscape remains highly polarized, primarily between the Awami League (AL), which is rooted in secular-nationalist principles, and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which has historically aligned with Islamist parties. This polarization has fostered a political culture in which both secularism and Islam are leveraged for partisan gain, rather than being seriously debated on substantive issues.[11]

The dominance of the Awami League (AL) under Sheikh Hasina has led to a stronger emphasis on secularism, resulting in restrictions on Islamic parties like Jamaat-e-Islami, which has been barred from participating in elections due to its involvement in the 1971 war. While these measures are framed as safeguards for secularism, they have also faced criticism for promoting authoritarianism and suppressing political pluralism.[12] Unlike Pakistan, where the military has significant influence, Bangladesh has maintained a stronger system of civilian rule, allowing for a longer, although imperfect, democratic process. According to Khan (2013), the stability of political settlements in Bangladesh has played a significant role in facilitating developmental progress and fostering relative institutional.[13]

Both Pakistan and Bangladesh have experienced authoritarianism and the influence of politicized religion, but Pakistan's democracy is weaker due to military interventions and the deep-rooted presence of Islamic ideology. In contrast, Bangladesh has upheld a secular state

[11] Shafi Md Mostofa, "Faith, Politics, and Power: The Evolution of Secularism and Authoritarianism in Bangladesh," *World Affairs* 187, no. 2 (April 15, 2024): 161–71, https://doi.org/10.1002/waf2.12015

[12] Md. Ishtiaq Ahmed Talukder, "Islamic Radicalization in Bangladesh: An Analysis of Political Islamism in Bangladesh," *Journal of Science and Technology.* 10, no. 1 (June 30, 2024): 17–27, https://doi.org/10.69728/jst.v10.21

[13] Khan, "The Political Settlement, Growth and Technical Progress in Bangladesh," *DIIS Working Paper*, 2013, https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/13049/1/DIIS%20BD%20Technology.pdf

with effective civilian governance, even though its democracy is challenged by partisan rivalries and a centralization of power. These differences underscore diverse strategies among political elites and varying public attitudes toward the role of religion in shaping national identity and politics.

In Pakistan and Bangladesh, the Islamic movement has significantly influenced political thought and policy, though in distinct ways. In Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq's rule from 1977 to 1988 marked a transformative period for the state as Islamic law was integrated into the legal system, education, and financial practices.[14] His initiatives, including the Hudood Ordinances and the Islamization of curricula, enhanced the influence of clerics and religious minorities within both formal and informal institutions. Zia's approach aimed not only to legitimize power through religion but also to disempower secular opposition, establishing a political consensus based on conservative Islamic values.[15] This institutional framework enabled the growth of madrassas, which became key centres of political Islam. Funded largely by Gulf donors, they provided religious education and fostered ideological activism. The relationship was mutually beneficial: the state used them for legitimacy, while clerical networks aimed to influence legislation and social norms.[16]

Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) is a contemporary Islamist movement focused on blasphemy issues. Unlike earlier Islamist parties like Jamaat-e-Islami, TLP relies on grassroots mobilization and religious populism. Its capacity to disrupt cities during protests highlights its growing political influence. Though TLP has limited legislative success, it's strength lies in its

---

[14] Quadri, "Bangladesh & Pakistan: Success of secularism and failure of fanaticism," Usanas Foundation, June 7, 2023, https://usanasfoundation.com/bangladesh-pakistan-success-of-secularism-and-failure-of-fanaticism

[15] Mohsin Bashir and Shoaib ul-Haq, "Why Madrassah Education Reforms Don't Work in Pakistan," *Third World Quarterly* 40, no. 3 (March 4, 2019): 595–611, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2019.1570820

[16] Shahidur Rahman and Md Masud-All-Kamal, *Social Transformation in Bangladesh: Pathways, Challenges and the Way Forward*, 2024.

ability to impose a "moral veto" through public mobilization rather than formal institutional participation.[17]

In Bangladesh, the trajectory of Islamic political influence has been shaped by a different historical context. Jamaat-e-Islami, which had collaborated with the Pakistani military during the 1971 Liberation War, was banned in the early years of independence. However, with the return to democracy in 1991, it re-entered politics as part of electoral coalitions, particularly with the BNP. While Jamaat never garnered significant vote share, its partnership with BNP allowed it to influence education and religious policy. However, its fortunes declined dramatically post-2013, following the Shahbagh protests and the subsequent war crimes trials, which led to the execution of several of its leaders. Talukder (2024) notes that this effectively neutralised Jamaat's role in mainstream politics and symbolised a reassertion of secular-nationalist narratives.[18] In the absence of Jamaat, political parties have been replaced by non-partisan Islamic movements such as Hefazat-e-Islam, connected to the Qawmi madrassa network. Emerging in 2013, Hefazat calls for Sharia-based legislation and opposes anti-Islamic influences. Although it claims non-political status, Hefazat has emerged as a major pressure group [19], prompting the Awami League government to respond with a mix of repression and concessions, such as recognizing Qawmi madrassa degrees. This reflects the Awami League's strategy to manage threats while risking the dilution of secular state ideals.

While Pakistan's Islamic movements are integrated within state institutions and can exert direct influence, in Bangladesh, these movements hold a more peripheral yet still important role as cultural and social influencers. Pakistan's trajectory reflects a pattern of collaboration between

[17] Abdul Wohab, "'Secularism' or 'no-secularism'? A complex case of Bangladesh," *Cogent Social Sciences* 7, no. 1 (January 1, 2021), https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2021.1928979

[18] Md. Ishtiaq Ahmed Talukder, "Islamic Radicalisation in Bangladesh: An Analysis of Political Islamism in Bangladesh," *Journal of Science and Technology.* 10, no. 1 (June 30, 2024): 17–27, https://doi.org/10.69728/jst.v10.21

[19] Abdul Wohab, "'Secularism' or 'no-secularism'? A complex case of Bangladesh," *Cogent Social Sciences* 7, no. 1 (January 1, 2021), https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2021.1928979

state institutions and Islamization, whereas Bangladesh appears to employ a more nuanced strategy, balancing between periods of repression and strategic accommodation.

In Pakistan, secular and modernist organizations encounter significant challenges due to state repression and threats from religious actors. The Islamization under Zia-ul-Haq restricted secular expression, and subsequent governments have largely failed to reinstate that space. Activists face censorship, legal threats, and violence, while those who voice criticism are often silenced. Although liberal voices emerge occasionally in this hybrid regime, they seldom lead to enduring political influence.[20]

In Pakistan, the judiciary, media, and civil society have occasionally pushed back against norms, resulting in important rulings on women's rights and minority protections, though implementation remains weak. The Lawyers' Movement of 2007 exemplifies secular mobilization but often dissipate under political pressure. Schulz (2024) observes that liberal forces lack institutional support, leading to fragmentation.[21] Conversely, Bangladesh's secular framework has been better systemized and upheld by the state, particularly during the period of Awami League dominance.[22] The party has advocated a secular-nationalist identity through constitutional amendments, educational reforms, and cultural initiatives. Talukder (2024) observes that this strategy has enabled the state to position itself as a defender of secularism while employing legal and administrative measures to oversee and curtail the activities of Islamist parties and movements. [23]

[20] Zahid Shahab Ahmed, "Islam and the politics of secularism in Pakistan," *Religions* 14, no. 3 (March 19, 2023): 416, https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14030416

[21] Mascha Schulz, "Singing Songs for a Secular Society? The Elusive Politics of Cultural Activism in Contemporary Bangladesh," *Modern Asian Studies*, October 11, 2024, 1–23, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x24000210

[22] "1971 Liberation War, Birth of Bangladesh and Comparison with Present Day Pakistan," n.d., https://www.efsas.org/publications/research-dossiers/1971-liberation-war,-birth-of-bangladesh-and-comparison-with-present-day-pakistan/

[23] Md. Ishtiaq Ahmed Talukder, "Islamic Radicalization in Bangladesh: An Analysis of Political Islamism in Bangladesh," *Journal of Science and Technology.* 10, no. 1 (June 30, 2024): 17–27, https://doi.org/10.69728/jst.v10.21

The ruling Awami League (AL) has drawn criticism for its authoritarian approach, equating dissent with extremism and silencing secular voices. The murders of atheist bloggers between 2013 and 2016 exposed significant flaws in the government's commitment to secularism. Mostofa (2024) contends that Shahbagh marked a crucial moment of generational and ideological resistance to both religious extremism and political compromise.[24] However, the practice of secularism in Bangladesh is compromised by state control, creating a paradox in which it is both endorsed and suppressed.[25] Unlike in Pakistan, where secularism is less integrated into the state ideology, in Bangladesh it is officially recognized but remains susceptible to manipulation.

In Pakistan, Islamic movements such as Jamaat-e-Islami and Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) stand in opposition to secular groups, thereby limiting the influence of modernist voices and fostering a conservative atmosphere. In a similar vein, Bangladesh faces challenges from Islamist organizations like Jamaat-e-Islami and Hefazat-e-Islam, which contest the principles of secularism. On the other hand, secular and modernist factions, backed by the Awami League, strive to counter these challenges through initiatives like the 2013 Shahbagh protests. However, their efforts are often complicated by alliances with Islamic groups.

Pakistan and Bangladesh exhibit notable similarities in the interplay between politics and religion. Both nations have undergone fluctuations between secularism and Islamization, influenced by shifting political necessities. In Pakistan, a clear transition can be observed from Jinnah's secular vision to Zia-ul-Haq's pronounced Islamization. On the other hand, Bangladesh, established on a secular nationalist foundation, has at times embraced Islamic symbols and figures, particularly during periods of military rule and under the BNP. In both

24 Shafi Md Mostofa, "Faith, Politics, and Power: The Evolution of Secularism and Authoritarianism in Bangladesh," *World Affairs* 187, no. 2 (April 15, 2024): 161–71, https://doi.org/10.1002/waf2.12015
25 Amna Ejaz Rafi, "Bangladesh–Pakistan Relations: Old and New Dimensions," in *Bangladesh on a New Journey*, 2024, 220–36, https://doi.org/10.5040/9789356405691.ch-011

countries, political elites have strategically employed religious parties to further their objectives. For example, parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami and Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) play crucial roles in garnering votes and mobilizing public support in Pakistan. This illustrates that religion serves not only as an ideological force but also as a strategic instrument in political calculation.[26]

The differences between Pakistan and Bangladesh provide key insights. In Pakistan, Islamic identity is deeply rooted in politics and the constitution, making it difficult for secular forces to challenge established religious frameworks. The military acts as a protector of Islamic ideology, aligning with religious stakeholders and promoting ideologically driven education. In contrast, Bangladesh has a stronger secular constitutional identity,[27] with the judiciary effectively limiting the power of Islamist parties, notably by banning Jamaat-e-Islami and establishing war crimes tribunals against those involved in the 1971 atrocities.

The strength of civil society and the state's capacity to combat extremism differs markedly between countries. In Pakistan, while civil society is vibrant, it operates under significant constraints imposed by both the military establishment and religious extremists. The state's inconsistent stance—oscillating between promoting and suppressing extremism—undermines the enforcement of coherent policies. In contrast, civil society in Bangladesh has demonstrated greater effectiveness in mobilizing around secular issues (notably the Shahbagh movement), and the state has shown a stronger ability to effectively marginalize radical forces, often at the expense of broader democratic freedoms.

---

[26] Vaishali Jaipal, "God, Guns, and the Ballot Box: The Decline of Religio-political Parties in Pakistan," orfonline.org, July 1, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/god-guns-and-the-ballot-box-the-decline-of-religio-political-parties-in-pakistan

[27] Bashir Hussain Shah, Muhammad Ahsan, Ghulam Mustafa, and Ziarat Ali, "Pakistan-Bangladesh Relations During Hasina Wajid Era: An Analysis," *Dialogue Social Science Review* (DSSR) 3, no. 2 (2025): 25–38, https://thedssr.com/index.php/2/article/view/267

Pakistan and Bangladesh, though born from a shared colonial history and Islamic cultural heritage, have charted markedly different courses in their approaches to balancing religion and democracy. Both nations have experienced fluctuating commitments to Islamization and secularism, but the degree and trajectory of these changes reveal considerable differences influenced by historical contexts, political manoeuvring, and institutional decisions. In Pakistan, religion has become deeply integrated into the state's constitutional and ideological framework. Military regimes, particularly that of Zia-ul-Haq, institutionalized Islamization, paving the way for religious actors to establish a lasting presence in the political landscape. Conversely, while Bangladesh has not been entirely free from religious pressures, it has robustly defended its secular identity, particularly under the leadership of the Awami League. The use of judicial mechanisms to limit the influence of radical Islamic groups, along with civil society mobilization seen in movements like Shahbagh, reflects a stronger alignment between the state and society around secular nationalism. However, this achievement has led to a narrowing of democratic space, with opposition voices increasingly being equated with extremism.

Bibliography

Ahmed, Zahid Shahab. "Islam and the politics of secularism in Pakistan." *Religions* 14, no. 3 (March 19, 2023): 416. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14030416.

A J Noorani, "Jinnah's 11 August 1947 Speech: A Powerful Vision of Religious Freedom and National Unity," *CQ Criterion Quarterly* 5, no. 2 (2010), https://criterion-quarterly.com/jinnahs-11-august-1947-speech/

Asif, Fatima Binte. "Religion As a Political Tool: Analysing How Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) Uses Islam as a Campaigning Tool." *SSLA Culminating Experience*, 2024.

Bashir Hussain Shah, Muhammad Ahsan, Dr. Ghulam Mustafa, and Ziarat Ali. 2025. "Pakistan-Bangladesh Relations During Hasina Wajid Era: An Analysis". *Dialogue Social Science Review (DSSR)* 3 (2):25-38. https://thedssr.com/index.php/2/article/view/267.

Ezzati, Morteza, lotfali agheli, and Vajihe Karami. "Assessing the Impact of Institutional and Political Factors on Financial Development in Selected Islamic Countries." *Development and Foresight Research Centre* 1, no. 2 (August 2020). https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.22034/pbr.2020.104641.

Gambrell, John, and Munir Ahmed. "Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan Martial Ruler in 9/11 Wars, Dies." *Apnews.Com*, 2023. https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-politics-pakistan-government-obituaries-b2fd939ae5643c60d6e702e77626a57b.

Hasan, Mubashar. "Democracy and Political Islam in Bangladesh." *South Asia Research* 31, no. 2 (July 2011). https://doi.org/10.1177/026272801103100201.

Hossain, Delwar. "Secularization, De-secularization and Re-secularization in Bangladesh: Does the 'Third Image' Matter?" *Studies in Indian Politics* 12, no. 1 (March 14, 2024): 78–90. https://doi.org/10.1177/23210230241235359

Hossain, Naomi. "Reflections on Bangladesh at 50." *Contemporary South Asia* 29, no. 4 (November 10, 2021): 495–99. https://doi.org/10.1080/09584935.2021.1997919

Jalal, Ayesha. "'Introduction.'" Essay. In *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*, 1–6. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Jawad, Khizar, and Ghulam Shabbir. "The Two-Nation Theory: Historical Roots, Political Implications and Contemporary relevance." *Pakistan Social Sciences Review* 9, no. I (January 2025): 65–66. https://doi.org/10.35484/pssr.2025(9-i)06

Kennedy, Charles H. "Islamization in Pakistan: Implementation of the Hudood Ordinances." *Asian Survey* 26, no. 4 (Winter 1987): 307–19. https://doi.org/https://www.jstor.org/stable/20839856

"Jinnah's Address." *Dawn*, August 11, 2017.

Khan. "The Political Settlement, Growth and Technical Progress in Bangladesh." *DIIS Working Paper*, 2013. https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/13049/1/DIIS%20BD%20Technology.pdf

Mostofa, Shafi Md. "Faith, Politics, and Power: The Evolution of Secularism and Authoritarianism in Bangladesh." *World Affairs* 187, no. 2 (April 15, 2024): 161–71. https://doi.org/10.1002/waf2.12015

Nadeeshani, HPI. "A Comparative Study of the Recent Political Trends of Pakistan and Bangladesh That Fluctuate between Democracy and Autocracy." *The International Journal of Humanities and Social Studies* 7, no. 11 (November 30, 2019). https://doi.org/10.24940/theijhss/2019/v7/i11/hs1911-101.

Nasr, Vali. "Military Rule, Islamism and Democracy in Pakistan." *The Middle East Journal* 58, no. 2 (April 1, 2004): 195–209. https://doi.org/10.3751/58.2.12

Noorani, A J. "Jinnah's 11 August 1947 Speech: A Powerful Vision of Religious Freedom and National Unity." *CQ Criterion Quarterly* 5, no. 2 (2010). https://criterion-quarterly.com/jinnahs-11-august-1947-speech/

Qamar, Fatima, and Khateeja Imran. "Political Development and Modernisation in Bangladesh." *South Asian Studies* 32, no. 1 (January 2017): 109–25.

Quadri. "Bangladesh & Pakistan: Success of secularism and failure of fanaticism." Usanas Foundation, June 7, 2023. https://usanasfoundation.com/bangladesh-pakistan-success-of-secularism-and-failure-of-fanaticism

Rafi, Amna Ejaz. "Bangladesh–Pakistan Relations: Old and New Dimensions." In *Bangladesh on a New Journey*, 220–36, 2024. https://doi.org/10.5040/9789356405691.ch-011

Rahman, Shahidur, and Md Masud-All-Kamal. *Social Transformation in Bangladesh: Pathways, Challenges and the Way Forward*, 2024.

Schulz, Mascha. "Singing Songs for a Secular Society? The Elusive Politics of Cultural Activism in Contemporary Bangladesh." *Modern Asian Studies* 58, no. 3 (April 2024): 957–79. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x24000210

"South Asia: Pakistan and Bangladesh." In *Geography*. Accessed April 6, 2025. https://geography.name/south-asia-pakistan-and-bangladesh/

Talukder, Md. Ishtiaq Ahmed. "Islamic Radicalisation in Bangladesh: An Analysis of Political Islamism in Bangladesh." *Journal of Science and Technology.* 10, no. 1 (June 30, 2024): 17–27. https://doi.org/10.69728/jst.v10.21

Wohab, Abdul. "'Secularism' or 'No-Secularism'? A Complex Case of Bangladesh." *Cogent Social Sciences* 7, no. 1 (January 1, 2021). https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2021.1928979